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Annotation 
N-version programming is one of the approach ensuring high reliability and 
fault-tolerance of software on the basis of program redundancy and diversity. This 
approach ensures that faults of one of the versions of an N-version software 
module will not result in malfunction of the module operation process. N-version 
software realization, as a rule, depends upon capacities and preferences of the 
teams of designers and developers. This work is an attempt to denote basic 
requirements, which should be met at design of N-version software to minimize 
occurrence of possible program faults and influence of the modules versions on 
one another. The requirements to versions (program modules) of N-version 
software allow to ensure high-level reliability and fault-tolerance due to 
elimination of possible influence of separate versions on each other. A special 
attention has been paid to their interaction, which should not have any impact on 
operation of the other components. For realization and research of N-version 
software developed taking into account the defined requirements an N-version 
software execution environment has been developed. Testing of the N-version 
software execution environment has demonstrated expediency of a component 
architecture application and high efficiency of N-version programming as a 
method of fault-tolerant software development.  
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Introduction 
Software plays a crucial role in modern information systems. In this regard, 
reliability of the software as a part of information systems is one of the most 
important criteria at the stage of software design and development. There is a 
number of approaches to provision of high-level reliability and fault-tolerance of 
software which are based on introduction of time, informational or program 
redundancy [1], [2]. 
One of the approach ensuring high reliability of software on the basis of 
program redundancy is N-version programming (NVP) [3]. NVP in combination 
with modern methods of program testing and validation provides high level of 
reliability for software component execution. This approach ensures that faults of 
one of the versions will not result in malfunction of the module operation process, 
and consequently, of the application software and the whole information and 
control system [4], [5]. Such fault-tolerance is important for safety-critical 
information systems [6]. 
At present, there is a wide range of information processing hardware where 
software of an information controlling system can be deployed [7]. The Concept of 
N-version software implies parallel run of its modules versions [8]. Optimal 
operation of parallel program versions requires a choice of an appropriate 
computation system with parallel architecture.  
The most suitable, but at the same time, more expensive one is an 
architecture with distributed memory, where each computational node has its own 
processor and memory [9]. However, using such computing system is not always 
possible. Other kind of a computer system which can be used for execution of 
versions of information and control system N-version software is a system with 
shared memory, where there is a number of processors (or cores of a multi-core 
processor) and single shared memory [10]. On the other hand, a shared memory 
can become a big problem at N-version software run. That is why there is a need to 
bring some requirements for design and deployment of N-version software for 
computer systems of that class.  
A general approach to development of highly reliable software based on the 
N-version principle does not have clearly defined requirements, and N-version 
software realization, as a rule, depends upon capacities and preferences of the team 
(teams) of designers and developers. This work is an attempt to denote basic 
requirements, which should be met at design of N-version software to minimize 
occurrence of possible program faults and influence of the modules versions on 
one another. Besides this, realization the stated requirements ensures conveniences 
of further work with the software and its support. 
The NVP concept presupposes that in the components realizing identical 
functions, a potential fault can happen in different points. This allows detecting a 
fault and avoiding failure of the software [11]. It is supposed that independence of 
potential faults of different module versions of N-version software can be achieved 
by means of diversity at development of N-version software [12]. As it was stated 
above, in this approach, potential faults occurs in different points of a program 
code, but such independence of faults lies at the level of source codes, which is a 
key problem. At the stage of N-version modules execution fault independence is 
lost due to the possible interactions of the modules versions have been neglected in 
the framework of the whole software exactly at the runtime stage.  
In practice, systems with shared memory are most frequently used: 
computers with multicore processors, SMP computers [13]. For the shared memory 
computing systems, the modules versions can work in a unified address space of 
memory, share the same resources of the operating system, and so owing to this, 
additional dependencies between the modules of the N-version software emerge. 
Hence, a fault of one module version can result in a fault of other versions or even 
in a failure of the whole software system. This discredits reliability of N-version 
software and the whole method in general. Solution of this problem lies in 
preserving the diversity at the modules design stage and also in transferring it to 
the N-version software run stage. The requirements which should be met by the 
developed N-version modules of the software used in the safety-crucial areas were 
formulated to solve this problem.  
 
Requirements for design and development of N-version software  
N-version model of software design is an outstanding example of modular 
design. Each of the N-version software versions represents a program module. 
Further, the article will consider program modules as versions of a software 
module, which, in its turn, features an abstraction realized via concrete program 
modules, (i.e. versions).  
Module architecture of N-version software system will be efficient only in 
case if the set of requirements below has been satisfied. 
 
Dynamic connection of the program modules  
A dynamic connection of the program modules allows to replace the 
program modules of the system during its operation. Program module replacement 
support during execution demands a dynamic connection. The replacement of the 
system program modules should be done with no additional re-linking or 
recompilation of the program. 
However the need to replace the program modules during the program 
system operation arises rarely, nonetheless, in a crucial application, a supporting 
mechanism for it may be very desirable. Support of a program module replacement 
during the program system run stipulates a necessity for a dynamic connection. 
The importance of the modules dynamic connection can be estimated 
through the example of an application composed of the modules which can not be 
joined during runtime. If a replacement of one of the modules of such system is 
required, it will require to relink or recompile the program statically and to deploy 
it anew. An application composed of a set of modules that need to be statically 
relink every time one of them is replaced is equivalent to a monolithic application. 
This requirement is equivalent to hardware methods of ensuring reliability 
by means of hot swap [14]. In hardware when a failure occurs, a defective 
component is replaced by a new one from a set of spare parts. Employing such 
approach for software will allow increasing reliability of the program system. 
However, there is an important difference between software and hardware. In most 
cases, software presents a completed and compiled full code of a program; this 
code is loaded to the computer memory for execution. That is why there is no need 
to compile the whole program system when separate dynamically connected 
modules are available. 
Besides, the given requirement implicitly indicates that every program 
module should operate with its own memory data. This means that two program 
modules can not share memory as the memory allocated for the module under 
replacement has to be cleared and by no means should influence the operation of 
other modules and the whole program system. 
The specified possibility of accessing the same memory block by 
independent program modules can cause correlated errors in the program modules 
of the N-version software system, which in its turn will cause troubles in 
assessment of the program modules operation results and will lead to lowering the 
reliability factor of the program system. That is why access of several program 
modules to single memory block is worth excluding at all to avoid negative 
consequences. 
 
Encapsulation requirement   
This requirement results from the program module dynamic connection 
requirement. To form a software system, the program modules connect to each 
other through interfaces. If one of the program modules needs a replacement, this 
requires to disconnect the old one from the system and connect a new one. The 
new program module shall be connected the same way as the old one was, 
otherwise the components will have to be recoded, recompiled and relinked. Thus, 
the program modules and clients have to remain their interfaces unchanged. They 
must be encapsulated. 
Let us define some terms connected to encapsulation. A program or a 
module using the other program module is called a client. A client connects to a 
program module via an interface. If a program module changes without a change 
of an interface, no changes in the client will be required. Likewise, if a client 
changes without any changes of the interface, there is no need to change a program 
module. However, if changing either a client or a program module causes changing 
of the interface, the other side of the interface also needs to be changed. 
So, to use the advantages of dynamic connection, the program modules and 
clients should not change their interfaces. They should be encapsulated. The details 
of the client and program module realization should not be reflected in the 
interface. The more reliably an interface is isolated from the realization, the less 
possibly it will change after modification of a client or a program module. If an 
interface does not change, changing of a program module has a minor effect for the 
software system as a whole. 
A need for isolation of the client from the realization details imposes a 
number of important requirements on the components. Such requirements are listed 
below: 
a) A program module must hide the used programming language. Any client 
must have a possibility to use a program module irrespective of the programming 
languages used. Reveling the language of realization makes new dependencies 
between the client and the program module. 
b) The program modules must be distributed in binary form. Indeed, as they 
should hide the realization language, they need to be delivered being already 
compiled, linked and ready for usage. 
c) There should be a possibility to upgrade the program modules without 
affecting already existing clients. New versions of the program module should be 
capable to work with both the new and the old clients. 
d) There should be a possibility to transparently move the program modules 
in the network. It is required that both the program module and the system using it 
could be executed within one process, in different processes or on different 
machines. A client should take a remote module the same as a local one. Should 
one work with a remote module otherwise than with a local module, this would 
require recompilation of the client every time when the local module moves to 
other location of the network.  
 
Inter-module access (protection) 
This requirement provides safe interaction of the program modules in the 
framework of the program system. Execution of incorrect or erroneous code 
accidentally or deliberately inserted to the structure of one of the program modules 
should not have any unforeseen impact on the state of other modules and even 
more so, on the system in general. Inter-module interaction needs to be organized 
so that it will eliminate the module operation troubles caused externally, namely, 
unallowed access of the other modules. For this purpose, it is enough to ensure that 
all the accesses to any program module are performed only by means of the 
instruments prescribed by the developers of this very program module, i. e. via 
interface.  
The aim of inter-module protection is to ensure safe interaction of the 
program modules within the system. It is impossible to provide faultless operation 
of a program module picked at random, in other words, to detect and remedy all 
the errors made during the module development [15]. Nevertheless, inter-module 
interaction can be organized in such a way that is sufficient to eliminate 
disfunctions in the program module operation caused by external reasons, namely, 
unallowed access by the other program modules. It is enough to have all accesses 
to this program module carried out only via the interface. Any interaction that by-
passes the interface means a potential violation of internal logic of the program 
module and its unpredictable behavior later on. 
In the high-level programming languages, the correct interaction of the 
program objects, including program modules, is ensured by a type system, by 
mechanisms of scopes and access modes. Yet all these mechanisms are non-
operational at the binary level after compilation of the program. A robust 
protection, for example, in case of using operations of direct memory access or 
transfer of control on dynamically calculated addresses is not possible without 
proper checks during runtime of the program [16]. 
Let us consider a set of all exported program objects of the module and a set 
of the module internal objects, links to which are someway transferred to the other 
program modules. This set shall be called an interface of the module. The purpose 
of inter-module protection is to guarantee that the objects which are not included 
into the module interface are impossible to be read or modified from the other 
modules. In order to prevent a module that has access to the interface objects of the 
other module from getting access to its internal objects, control over observing of 
the following conditions should be ensured. 
a) Control of data bounds. As variables are often located in the continuous 
memory block, the ability to overrun the block taken by one variable means an 
ability to access the neighboring variables, which is an access violation. 
b) Control of code bounds. Distinguishing data from code is significant for 
protection. Usage of the some other module code instead of data means a 
possibility of dynamic modification for this code. Usage of the data of other 
program module instead of a code means a possibility to interpret random data as 
machine’s commands, which results in unpredictable behaviors of the program 
module. 
c) Control of memory free. In case of reuse of a memory area, it is necessary 
to provide that the pointers stored during the first usage can not be read during 
further use of this page. 
d) Control of pointers to the destructed objects. A pointer to the object which 
lifetime has already ended can result in an unpredictable behavior, and in case of 
reuse of the memory – to the access violation. 
Absence of inter-module protection leads to emerging of correlated errors. 
As it is described in [17], correlated errors between the versions can increase the 
total probability of an error occurrence by several orders of magnitude more.  
Let us consider the program that consists of three versions (program 
modules) and is tolerant to failures of one version for any input data. Let us 
suppose that probability that the version will give an incorrect result equals q = 
10−4, i. e.  an average incorrect output happens one time to 10 000 runs. If the 
versions are stochastically independent, then the error occurrence probability for 
the program with three versions is   
q3 + 3 q2 (1 – q) ≈ 3 ∙ 10−8. 
Now let us suppose that a stochastic independence can not be applied, and 
that there is one deficient mode typical for two out of these three versions 
(program modules) and emerges in average once for a million runs (i. e. 
approximately one out of 100 bugs of the version occurs due to a common 
mistake). Every time when this bug happens, the program fails. The error 
probability of the three-version system now increases to over 10−6, which is more 
than 30 times the error probability of the uncorrelated system [17]. 
 
Independence of the program modules from the programming language  
This requirement partially results from the encapsulation requirement stated 
in the above. Another reason for such requirement is economic expediency: the 
broader the number of supported programming languages, the greater the number 
of external developers who can write the necessary program modules. Besides, 
different versions of compilers have different mechanisms of error detection in the 
code at the stage of compiling and linking. 
Everyone who has experience in programming knows, that a programming 
language can drastically influence the quality of the software being developed. So, 
it is supposed that a program written in Assembler tends to be more bug-prone, 
than that in the high-level language [18]. The nature of bugs can differ. For 
instance, for programs written in C there is a possibility of the buffer overflow. 
Such bugs would be impossible in language that strictly manages memory. Bugs 
resulted from incorrect use of the pointers, which is not a rare case for the 
programs written in C, will not happen in Fortran which has no pointers [17], [19].  
 Various programming languages can have various libraries and compilers, 
which, as a user expects, will have uncorrelated (or better negatively correlated) 
bugs.  
Certain languages can be more adaptable to this aspect than other ones. For 
example, capacities of Lisp for expression construction are more suitable for some 
tasks of artificial intelligence than those ones of C or Fortran [20].  
In this case, if all the versions are written in one most appropriate language, 
then different versions can encounter with correlated errors. If the versions are 
written in different languages, then the error rate of the N-version software system 
can be lower, as possible errors will not be correlated. Similar observation is also 
applicable to using the diversity in other aspects, such as development 
environments or instruments.  
It is obvious than independence of the modules from the programming 
language can not be unimportant for development of fault-tolerant N-version 
software. The principle of diversity is ensured by development of different 
versions of the modules implementing different languages. All this allows to 
decrease a possibility of simultaneous occurrence of faults in different module 
versions and to increase general fault-tolerance of the N-version software system. 
 
Results and Discussion 
For realization and research of N-version software developed taking into 
account the above defined requirements an N-version software execution 
environment (NVX) has been developed on the grounds of the component 
approach [21]. N-version software execution environment consists of several 
components and a set of interfaces (figure 1).  
The main specific feature of the developed NVX is runtime support for the 
program modules realized as independent components which can be executed in 
the processes separate from the NVX. Moreover, the program components can be 
located on different computers and interact with NVX by means of a network. 
Firstly, this solves the performance problem of a computer; secondly, provides the 
protection of the program modules from each other and from errors of runtime 
environment.  
Other functional modules of NVX are also realized as separate components, 
which enables upgrading and replacement of NVX separate parts with minimal 
efforts. Particularly, depending on the applied task that can be solved by N-version 
software, the subsystem of making a decision about correctness of version 
operation results can be replaced with more suitable variant taking into 
consideration characteristics of specific task. 
The most significant task is protection of the NVX from destructive external 
influence, so a user interacts with the runtime environment only via a special 
interface component. A component of the user interface interacts with the 
environment component only via special interfaces provided by the environment; 
that allows protection of the environment from incorrect actions of the user. 
 
 Development of this runtime environment for N-version software strived the 
research purposes; that is why: 
 N-version software program modules have been developed taking into 
account the proposed  requirements; 
 The NVX  input/output components do not interact with any external objects 
and have been designed to emulate such interaction; 
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 Data processed by N-version software have been modelled , for the purposes 
of testing and definition of the NVX properties; 
 Errors occurring in the program modules have been injected at the 
development stage and designed for testing and analysis of the consequences 
for the NVX and N-version software [22], [23]. 
The results of testing of the N-version software developed subject to the 
described requirements in the suggested runtime environment are specified below. 
Testing was performed with changing of various parameters, and allowed to find 
out strengths and weaknesses of N-version approach to realization of fault-tolerant 
software. Table 1 specifies the parameters of errors injected to the realized 
modules. 
 
Table 1. Errors injected into the program modules  
N Occurrence 
probability  
Error Consequences 
of the error  
1 0.045 Arithmetic computation error  fault 
2 0.038 Arithmetic computation error fault 
3 0.015 Arithmetic computation error fault 
4 0.18 Memory access error  failure 
5 0.072 Logic error, circularity failure 
6 0.031 Logic error, infinite recursion failure 
 
Analyzing the results of testing carried out with the N-version software 
runtime environment; one can draw the two main conclusions: 
1) The developed runtime environment worked reliable during testing 
even if errors occurred in individual program modules; 
2) Rising the number of program modules by one allows to lower 
probability of the whole system fault by order of magnitude greater (see 
table 2). Fault probability assessment for the runtime environment was 
performed with the use of the software reliability assessment model 
developed by the authors earlier [24]. 
 
Table 2. Correlation of the whole program system fault and a number of 
program modules  
Parameters 
Amount of program components 
2 3 4 5 
Probability of fault of the program 
system  
0.04783 0.00186 0.00029 0.00003 
 
Testing results of N-version software in the framework of the developed 
environment of N-version software run support the theoretical conclusions about 
the provision of fault tolerance with three of more modules. 
The requirements described above should be performed at development of 
any N-version software system.  
Meeting the suggested requirements at development of N-version software 
enables achieving the following results: 
- elimination of mutual influence of the program modules  on each other’s 
operation; 
- localization of the program bugs and quick feedback; 
- convenient deployment and enlargement the N-version program system; 
- enlarging the circle of possible developers for the program modules of the 
N-version program system. 
 
Conclusion 
N-version software is used in a number of critical areas and successfully 
ensures the required tolerance to program and, sometimes, to hardware failures. 
Three are a lot of works dedicated to the software reliability issue and particularly 
to NVP. The authors distinguish more new aspects that, if taken into consideration, 
can help to avoid faults in the software systems. 
This article is devoted to a topic which has not drawn much attention of 
researchers and practical professionals before – the requirements to design and 
development of N-version software program modules. The article formulates the 
main requirements to versions (program modules) of N-version software which 
ensure a high-level reliability and fault-tolerance due to elimination of possible 
influence of separate versions on each other. A special attention has been paid to 
their interaction, which should not have any impact on operation of the other 
components. 
The proposed requirements are especially important at the stage of design 
and development of the modules versions of N-version software for machines with 
shared memory. 
Creation of the environment for the program module N-version run and a set 
of program modules became a result of practical realization of the N-version 
approach to development of a fault-tolerant software with component design. 
Design and realization of the program modules took place with the consideration 
of the stated requirements. Testing of the N-version software runtime environment 
showed expediency of a component architecture application and high efficiency of 
NVP as a method of fault-tolerant software development. 
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